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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of
the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so
many years. We were absolutely certain that we had won the
first great victory of the peace--and., by 1 we.., t I mean all of us.,
the whole human race. The Russians had proved that they could
be reasonable and farseeing and there wasn 1t any doubts in the
minds of the President or any of us that we could live with them
or get along with them peacefully as far into the future as any
of us could imagine (49:870).
So resounded the optimistic appraisal of Harry Hopkins
upon leaving Yalta in February., 1945.

Robert Sherwood (49:869)., in

his book., Roosevelt and Hopkins., described the mood of the American
delegation as "• •• one of supreme exultation as they left Yalta.
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In

addition., statesman McGeorge Bundy {9:621).., in Foreign Affairs
magazine., stated that., "Praise of Yalta was well-nigh universal.,
running from Herbert Hoover to Henry Wallace by way of Governor
Dewey.

Many a man was aware that the proof of the pudding would

come in the eating., but few indeed were prepared to deny that a good
beginning had been made."
Yet., this almost universal praise of the Crimea or Yalta
Conference rapidly vanished.

The word Yalta became to many the

symbol of betrayal as the Soviets began their many violations of the
Yalta agreements., even before Franklin D. Roosevelt could report on
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this conference to Congress.

Of all the settlements reached among

the Big Three,. Roosevelt:, Churchill, and Stalin,. perhaps only one-the secret Far Eastern Agreement--has been more severely
criticized than the decision reached in regard to the Polish settlement.
The Polish problems were discussed at seven of the eight plenary
meetings.

The British records contain an interchange of nearly

eighteen thousand words on this one subject between Roosevelt,
Churchill., and Stalin {12:: 36 5).

More time was spent in discussion

of this single topic than on any other one.

With all of this apparent

concern by the Big Three regarding Poland, why has there been so
much criticism of the Polish settlement at Yalta?

Did Roosevelt and

Churchill actually appease Stalin in regard to the Polish settlement?
What was this settlement at Yalta--an act of betrayal or an act of
realism?

This is the confusing question that the writer of this paper

will attempt to answer.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING
THE POLISH SETTLEMENT

One needs to understand some background factors before
beginning a summarization of the Polish discussions at the Yalta
Conference.

One of these pertained to the military situation of the

war at the time of the conference.
off.

The defeat of Japan seemed far

General MacArthur had returned to the Philippines., but bloody

fighting remained, with Luzon., Iwo Ji.ma, and Okinawa still to be
taken.

No one knew, apparently., how many months of fighting would

be needed to defeat the Japanese on their own home land.

On the

western front the Anglo-American forces,. who had just recovered the
ground lost in the Battle of the Bulge., were barely inside the German
boundary.

In Italy they had made slow progress in the Apennines and

still had to reach the Po River (42:298).

On the eastern front,, the

Russians, however., held most of Eastern Europe including all of
Poland as German resistance had diminished under the onslaught of
the Red Army.

The Russians had driven the Germans back within

thirty-three miles of Berlin (41: 356).
Second., as the allies approached the final stages of the war
in Europe, two major areas of disagreement affecting Poland had
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developed between the Soviet Union and the United States and Great
Britain.

What were to be the exact boundaries of Poland?

Earlier.,

the London Polish government had refused to recognize the Curzon
Line as a fair eastern boundary for Poland.

The Curzon Line was a

border which had been adopted by the Supreme Allied Council in 1919
as a fair ethnographical boundary between the then newly createe:l.
Poland and her neighbor Russia (65:629).

Churchill and Stalin had,.

in 1943 at the Teheran Conference, agreed upon the Curzon Line as
the basis of the eastern boundary., but Roosevelt had not officially
committed the United States concerning this line.
Next., and of more importance than the boundary settlement.,
was the problem of choosing Poland's official government.

The United

States and Great Britain believed that the London Polish government
was the legitimate government of Poland as it was the same government
that was forced to flee Poland when Germany and the Soviet Union
conquered the country in 1939.

Before leaving Poland, however.,

President Moscicki resigned and designated Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz as
his successor.

Th is government which then became headed by the

newly appointed prime minister., General Sikorski., moved to France
in 1939 and later to London after the fall of France in 1940. At the
time of the Yalta Conference., the London Polish government had not
only the allegiance of the Polish troops fighting under the Allied
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commands but also the support of the Poles then living within Poland.
Meanwhile. the Russians had recognized the Lublin Committee. a
group of Communists and fellow travelers that had been set up in
Polish territory from which the Ger.mans had been driven by the
advancing Russian army early in 1944. It was headed by Boleslaw
Bierut., former Co.mintern agenta who had adopted Soviet citizenship.
The Soviets had recognized the London Polish government from 1941
until 194.3 when the London government proposed an investigation of
the Katyn Massacre 1 by the International Red Cross.

Roosevelt

attempted., late in 1944., to delay the Soviet recognition of the Lublin
Committee until the Big Three could discuss this matter at Yalta. but
Stalin gave official recognition to the Lublin Committee on January 1.,
1945 (31:394-95).

Consequently. when the Big Three met at Yalta in

February., 1945., the two major problems that needed to be settled
concerning Poland were the boundaries and the formation of a government that all three nations could officially recognize.
The Yalta Conference was the second face-to-face meeting

1 This was the brutal slaughtering of fifteen-thousand Polish
officers by the Russians in 1940 after the Soviets had divided Poland
with Germany. When these slain officers were discovered by Nazi
soldiers in 1943., the London Poles demanded an immediate investigation; thereby causing the Soviet Union to break off diplomatic relations
with the London exile government {59: 379).
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of the Big Three.

Earlier in 1943., Roosevelt., Churchill., and Stalin

had met at Teheran.

This meeting was mainly a military conference.,

whereas the Yalta Conference., as it developed-> concerned itself more
with political problems than with the military strategy.

On the trip to

Yalta-> Fleet Admiral Leahy {36:293) stated that->
The President approached the Yalta meeting in a confident
mood. At Teheran the United States and Britain were somewhat
on the defensive about a second front and Stalin had been very
blunt in his demands that we make good on our promises. As
February., 1945-> began., there were more than one million
American troops opposing the Germans on the Western front.
Most of France had been liberated and the one major counterthrust attempted by the Ger.mans had been repulsed. Roosevelt
was supremely confident that we would succeed in destroying the
Ger.man army. He was going to be able to show Stalin that we
had made good on our pledges.

CHAPTER III

SUMMARIZATION OF POLISH DISCUSSIONS

Roosevelt opened the Yalta discussion concerning Poland by
stating that since he had come from America he had a distant view on
the Polish question.

He felt that most of the five to six million Poles

within the United States anticipated the loss of Eastern Poland;
therefore they favored the Curzon Line.

Roosevelt also stated that he

would prefer that the Soviet Union would make some concessions such
as allowing Poland to retain the important city of Lwow, which is
located east of the Curzon Line and giving Poland some oil-bearing

,,
lands to counterbalance the loss of Konigsberg.

But, the most

important consideration, he felt., was establishing a permanent government for Poland.

The President desired a government which would be

representative and which the great majority of Poles would support,
even if it were only an interim one (12:367).
Churchill (26:668) then stated that he favored the Curzon Line
as Polandts Eastern border., because he felt that., after the agonies
that Russia had suffered in the war., " • • • the Curzon Line was not a
decision of force but one of right." Churchill., as did Roosevelt, also
suggested that Stalin might relinquish Lwow to Poland.

The Prime

Minister then stated that honor was the sole reason that caused Britain,
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in 1939., to declare war in order to aid Poland against Hitler 1 s brutal
onslaught and., as a result., Britain could never accept any settlement
which did not leave Poland free., independent., and sovereign.
Stalin (26:669) followed Churchill 1 s statement by declaring
that he understood that the Polish question was one of honor for
Britain., but that for the Soviet Union it was a question of both honor
and security.

It was a matter of honor because the Russians had had

many conflicts with the Poles and the Soviet government wished to
eliminate the causes of these conflicts.

The Polish question was a

matter of security for two reasons., Stalin stated.

First., Poland

bordered Russia., and second., throughout history Poland had been a
corridor through which Russia 1 s enemies had passed to attack her.
These enemies had marched through Poland because she had been
weak; consequently Russia wanted to see a strong and powerful
Poland that could close this corridor by her own strength.

In regard to the Polish boundary., Stalin com.men ted that
Russia could accept nothing less than the Curzon Line.

He (26:669}

said.,
• • • that not Russians but Curzon and Clemenceau fixed
this line. The Russians had not been invited and the line was
established against their will. Lenin had opposed giving
Bialystok Province to the Poles but the Curzon Line gives it to
Poland. We have already retreated from Lenin rs position in
regard to this province. Should we then be less Russian than
Curzon and Clemenceau? We could not return to Moscow and
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face the people who would say Stalin and Molotov have been less
sure defenders of Russian interest than Curzon and Clemenceau.
It is. therefore. impossible to agree with the proposed .modification of the line. I would prefer to have the war go on although it
will cost us blood in order to compensate for Poland from
Ger.many. • • • I favor the Polish frontier on the West Neisse
and ask the conference to support this proposal.
Stalin completed his dramatic speech by expressing his contempt for
the London government with which both the United States and Great
Britain were .maintaining diplomatic relations.

He charged that the

London exiled group had interfered continuously with the operations of
the Red Ar.my in Poland {26:770}.
At the next session of the Big Three. Mr. Molotov read a
six-point proposal 2 regarding the Polish question.

This Russian

proposal was generally acceptable to Roosevelt and to Churchill as
far as _its wording was concerned; however• both had comments to
offer.

,,

,

Roosevelt disliked the use of the word e.migre in point three.

as he felt that Poland had a sufficient number of citizens to use in
increasing the size of the Provisional government.

,

Churchill also

,

disliked the use of e.migre and also the location of the western boundary
of Poland in point two.

,

,

He said that the word, e.migre. meant in

England. a person who had been driven out of his country by his own
people.

The Prime Minister favored moving the western boundary of

2 Refer to appendix for a copy of this proposal.
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Poland into Ger.man territory but not so far west as Molotov had
suggested, as this proposal would necessitate the transferring of too
many Ger.mans, who were then living in this area (26:716-17).
The next day, Roosevelt presented an Anglo-American
revised proposal for Poland in which he suggested a Presidential
Committee of three Polish leaders who would go to Moscow to form a
Provisional government.

These three representatives from Warsaw,

London, and inside Poland would not only form a provisional government but also make plans to hold free elections as soon as possible
(26:792).
Mr. Molotov disagreed with Rooseveltts suggestion to have
this group of three form a new government for Poland. He said that
the Lublin government, which was then ruling in Poland, was very
popular and well respected within Poland itself.

This could not be

said, Molotov continued, of the London group, as it had fled Poland
during the war.

As a result, he felt that the Polish people would not

accept Roosevelt's proposal; therefore, he suggested that it would be
best to enlarge the present Lublin government (12:377).
But, the Prime Minister could not accept the Russian 1 s
views as British intelligence had informed him that the Lublin government did not have the support of the people within Poland and of the onehundred fifty thousand Poles fighting in the war.

He said that it would
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appear as if the British had betrayed Poland if her Majestyts government transferred recognition to the Lublin government.

Churchill

then said that before any transfer of recognition by the British• her
government would have to be convinced that the new provisional
government was truly representative of the Polish people and that free
and unfettered elections would have to be held in Poland by ballot and
with universal suffrage and free candidacies {12: 377-79).
Stalin (36:310) then argued that the Lublin government was
very popular within Poland and that the entire Polish population
disliked all Poles who had left their homeland for foreign countries
during its period of distress.

Until elections could be held., he

contended that the Allies should deal with the Polish government in the
same manner as they dealt with General de Gaulle's French government\ which also was not elected.

Stalin then said that he did not

know whether Bierut or General de Gaulle
• • • enjoyed the greatest degree of popularity- -yet we all
had dealt with de Gaulle and the Soviet government concluded a
treaty with him. Why should we be so different with regard to
the Polish government, and why could we not deal with an
enlarged Polish government? • • • He said it would be better to
deal with the reconstruction of the Provisional government
rather than to attempt to set up a new one {26:780).

~eneral de Gaulle., leader of the Free French Movement
during World War Two., was not elected by the French people• yet he
was generally recognized as the French leader in their struggle
against Germany.
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Stalin concluded by stating that he believed that elections could be held
in Poland within a month unless a catastrophe occurred on the front.
The next day., Mr. Molotov produced a new proposal
concerning the government of Poland.

The Lublin government was to

be " ••• reorganized on a wider democratic basis., with the inclusion
of democratic leaders from Poland., itself., and also from those living
abroad" (12:382).

Once reorganized., the Lublin government would

hold free elections and the United States., Britain and Russia would
recognize whatever government emerged.

Molotov., however., refused

to agree to allow the three ambassadors in Warsaw to observe and to
report that the elections actually would be free and unfettered., as he
said that this would offend the Poles.

Following minor discussion.

Molotovr s proposal was accepted by Roosevelt., Churchill., and Stalin.,
thus solving the major conflict among the Big Three., the establishment
of a Provisional government for Poland.
The one serious Polish problem remaining centered around
the question of supervision of the elections.

The only concession that

Stalin would grant was that after the new Polish government was
recognized., the United States and Great Britain could send ambassadors
to Poland., where there would be no interference by the Red Army.

The

ambassadors would., however., have to make their own arrangements
with the Polish government (12:385).

Churchill (12:385) admitted that
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this arrangement was not completely satisfactory to him., but as he
said, "This was the best I could get."
The following day., February tenth 41 the Big Three completed
their discussion concerning Poland by arriving at a final agreement
concerning the eastern and western borders of Poland.

It was decided

that the eastern border should follow the Curzon Line with digressions
from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland.
They decided against establishing a definite boundary on the West as
they felt that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity, the name chosen for Poland ts new provisional government, should be sought in this matter.

The Big Three, however.,

agreed that Poland must receive a substantial area in the North and in
the West (26:898-99).
Having reached a final agreement in regard to the Polish
problem., the next day., Roosevelt., Churchill., and Stalin affixed their
signatures not only to the Polish settlement but also tb the whole Yalta
document.

These three leaders had completed their task.

would decide the wisdom of their decisions.

Now history

Each would have to wait

to see if these agreements were going to be kept.

The Russians had

promised that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity
would hold " • • • free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on
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the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot" 4 (26:973).

Yet,. as

historians know., the Soviet Union definitely violated this pledge on at
least three specific points.
First.. the elections which were to have been held "as soon
as possible" were not conducted until January., 1947--al.most two years
after the Yalta Conference; thus giving the Communist party considerable time to infiltrate and to subvert the political scene within Poland.
Second.. the manner in which the election campaigning was held
completely violated the Yalta pledge.
the campaign.

No freedom was allowed during

Stanislaw Mikolajczyk 1 s Polish Peasant party (PSL).,

the main opposition party to the Communist sponsored parties., had
a terror campaign unleashed against it during the period from 1946
until the elections of 1947.

Over one-hundred thousand PSL members

were arrested and so.me one-hundred thirty murdered.

Third.,

falsification of election returns took place during the 1947 election.
So called electoral .mathematicians were sent to each district by the
Communist Party to "fix" the outcome of the elections so that the
desires of their party would be met (52:45-55).

As a result of these

violations., a major controversy has developed since 1945.
One of the most haunting questions in American history is

4 Refer to the appendix for a final copy of the Polish Settlement.
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whether or not Yalta 1 s Polish settlement was a betrayal of American
interests.

If the settlement was not a betrayal., then was Roosevelt

simply guilty of poor judgement?
settlement for Poland?

Or., did he gain the best possible

Before venturing his own conclusions to this

controversial subject., the writer believes that it is necessary to
discuss the criticisms and the defenses of the Polish Settlement.

CHAPTER IV

CRITICISMS AND DEFENSES OF THE POLISH SETTLEMENT

I.

CRITICS OF THE SETTLEMENT

G. F. Hudson {31 :393) in The Twentieth Century magazine
stated in reference to Yalta, "It is fairly plain what Stalin wanted- which was in the main identical with what he got." In fact., Mr.
Hudson (31:402) labeled the Polish decision a betrayal.

Mr. Hudson's

main criticism of the Polish settlement is derived from the fact that
no reference is made in the agreement to the government which had
led Poland's war efforts for more than five years.

The agreement

merely stated that "• •• the Provisional Government which is now
functioning in Poland (i.e., the Lublin Committee) should be
reorganized on a broader democratic basis., with the inclusion of
democratic leaders from Poland and from Poles abroad" (31:396).
Chester Wilmot., in his book., The Struggle for Europe., is
also critical of the agreement to reorganize the new Polish government.

In the early phases of the Yalta Conference., Roosevelt.and Churchill
stated that Poland must have a completely new provisional government;
not one that was based upon either the London or Lublin governments.
The British also demanded that the new government be pledged to
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holding free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis
of universal suffrage and secret ballot., and that the American.
British. and Soviet Ambassadors should supervise these elections.
Molotov., meanwhile., had been insisting upon the enlargement of
the Lublin government.

He also stated that supervision of the Polish

elections would be an affront to the pride and sovereignty of the
independent people of Poland (65:656).
Mr. Wilmot (65:656) stated.,
• • • while the British and Americans started by refusing to
accord any recognition whatever to the Lublin Committee., they
ended by allowing it to be described in the communique as the
present Provisional government of Poland. Moreover., although
they had originally insisted that an entirely fresh administration
should be formed. they finally agreed to the words., "the
Provisional government now functioning in Poland should be
reorganized. 11 The only real difference between that formula
and what Stalin had initially demanded was a change in verb;
'enlarged' had become 'reorganized. 1
Another Yalta critic., William Henry Chamberlain (21:48).,
stated that " • • • there was not one positive., worthwhile contribution
to European revival and stability in the sordid deals of Yalta., only
imperialistic power politics at its worst.

11

He believed that the Polish

decisions violated the Atlantic Charter by assigning Polish territory to
the Soviet Union and German territory to Poland without plebiscites.
Polish historian., Oscar Halecki {29:328)., stated that the
Russians were less inclined to make concessions on the Polish issue
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than on anything else at Yalta.

Mr. Halecki is critical of the Polish

decision as he felt that it was a mistake for the Western powers to
recognize the "enlarged" government of Poland without waiting for
the "free and unfettered" elections which were promised.

He was

also critical of the fact that no definite date was established on which
to hold these elections.
Arthur Bliss Lane {35:182), American Ambassador to Poland
at the time of the Yalta Conference., felt that four major mistakes
were made by Roosevelt and Churchill regarding Poland.

First., Lane

stated that the terms of the agreement were so general that they
could be interpreted in various manners.

Admiral Leahyts (3.6: 315)

statement to President Roosevelt at Yalta agrees with Lanet s
criticism.

Leahy said, "Mr. President, this is so elastic that the

Russians can stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without
ever technically breaking it." Second, the Ambassador was critical of
the fact that no provision was .trade for supervision of the elections by
the three allies.

Next, Mr. Lane did not believe that the Curzon Line

should have been chosen as Poland 1 s eastern border as this deprived
Poland of rich timberlands, oil fields, and the important city of Lwow.
Fourth., no provision was made for the safe return to Poland of the
Polish army.
John T. Flynn {23: 388}., an outspoken critic of President
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Roosevelt, strongly disagreed with the decision to compensate Poland
for lands lost in the East by giving her German land in the West.

He

said that Roosevelt and Churchill totally ignored the lessons in Alsace
and Lorraine, in the Sudetenland, and in the Polish Corridor.
Mr. Edward J. Rozek believed that Roosevelt and Churchill
were completely wrong in determining the future of Poland without
even consulting the Polish government.

In his book,. Allied Wartime

Diplomacy, Mr. Rozek (48:442) stated that.,
Churchill and Roosevelt chose to trust in Stalin ts promises
to establish a "strong., free, and democratic Poland" and
decided to ignore his previous record in his dealings with
Poland. This record included the deportation of Poles to
Russia, the liquidation of numerous Polish patriots, the Katyn
Massacre, the deliberate abandonment of the Warsaw insurgents
and their pitiless immolation of the Polish nation through NKVD
terror, and the continued demonstration of bad faith on the
part of the Soviets in their dealings with Poland. Against such
a background., it is difficult to understand how Churchill and
Roosevelt could believe in Stalin ts promises to carry out the
terms of the agreement, for both Churchill and Roosevelt had
unrestricted access to the Soviet record.
Though most of these charges that were made against Stalin are
seemingly true,. many scholarly experts do not agree that Yalta was a
"betrayal" or a "sell-out." Rather, .many well infer.med .men have co.me
to the defense of the Polish agreements that were made at Yalta.

II.

DEFENSES OF THE POLISH DECISION

Though defending the Polish decision at Yalta, few people today
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firmly believe that the settlement represented a triumph in American
diplomacy.

President Roosevelt., himself., did not claim that the

Polish settlement was a major victory for the Allies.

He {8:55)

told Congress., upon his return from Yalta., that the Polish settlement
was a compromise.

Yet., even a compromise on the Polish settlement

may have been a victory for the United States.
defenders have felt this way.

Many of Rooseveltrs

Two of these men attended the con-

ference at Yalta.
First., Admiral Leahy (36: 317) stated that., "Russia had kept
every military agreement made before that time." He also stated
that Russia showed a conciliatory attitude in agreeing to reorganize
the Polish government.

Edward R. Stettinius. Jr. (54:303).,

Roosevelt's Secretary of State in 1945., wrote that,
The agreement on Poland was. under the circumstances., a
concession by Marshal Stalin to the Prime Minister and the
President. It was not exactly what w:e wanted 1 but on the other
hand., it was not exactly what the Soviet Union wanted. It was
not a "sell-out" of democratic Poland., as has been so widely
charged, but a pledge from Stalin that he would allow a new
government to be organized and that free elections would be
held in a country which was entirely at his mercy. The trouble
was not the Yalta formula., but the fact that the Soviet Union
later failed to live up to the terms of the agreement.
Chester Wilmot (65:629)., a Yalta critic previously mentioned.,
conceded the fact that the Curzon Line had been adopted by the Supreme
Allied Council in 1919 as a fair ethnographical boundary between the
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then newly created Poland and Russia., her eastern neighbor.

This

line was proposed by the British Foreign Minister., Lord Curzon., in
1919.

This was the line which was roughly the frontier of Napoleonts

Duchy of Warsaw., which perished with the Grand Army in the retreat
from Moscow in 1812.

The Curzon Line of 1919., though not becoming

the boundary between Russia and Poland., was chosen as the border by
the Supreme Allied Council because most Poles lived west of this line
and non-Poles lived east of this line.

After Poland 1 s victory over

Russia in 1920-21., Poland pushed the frontier eastward., absorbing
approximately seven million non-Poles.

Then in 1940., when Poland

was again partitioned between Germany and Poland., the Soviet Union
returned to the Curzon Line (2:30).
In view of the aforementioned facts., Mr. Herbert Feis {19:32).,
author of Between War and Peace., believed that Winston Churchill.,
though he may not have wholeheartedly desired it so., supported
Stalin's argument to have the Curzon Line become Poland 1 s eastern
border.

Mr. Feis further mentioned the fact that Roosevelt agreed to

the Curzon Line as he felt that it was futile to try to deny what the
Soviet armies already held.
Mr. Oscar Halecki {29:326)" stated that Russia was less
inclined to make concessions on the Polish issue than on anything else
at Yalta.

Russia 1 s interest in Poland did not first appear at Yalta in
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1945.

On December 4., 1941., when the Germans were already in the

suburbs of Moscow., Stalin gave a lavish dinner at the Kremlin for the
Polish Prime Minister., General Sikorski.

During the party Sikorski

believed that he had found some mellowness in the Russian ruler.,
yet, it was at this point that Stalin turned to him and said., "Now., we
will talk about the frontier between Poland and Russia" (65:708).

In

view of Russiats imperialistic aim on Poland., what would have been
the results at Yalta had the Allies quarreled with Russia regarding
Poland before Germany was defeated?

Though one can only speculate

concerning this question a statement made by Winston Churchill
(12:402) does help to prove that Roosevelt and Churchill made the best
possible agreements under the circumstances regarding Poland.

The

Prime Minister stated that.,
It is not permitted to those charged with dealing with events

in time of war or crisis to confine themselves purely to the
statement of broad general principles on which good people agree.
They have to take definite decisions from day to day. They have
to adopt postures which must be solidly maintained, otherwise
how can any combinations for action be maintained? It is easy.,
after the Germans are beaten., to condemn those who did their
best to hearten the Russian military effort and to keep in
harmonious contact with our great Ally., who had suffered so
frightfully. What would have happened if we had quarreled with
Russia while the Germans had three or four hundred divisions on
the fighting front? Our hopeful assumptions were soon to be
falsified. Still., they were the only ones possible at the time.
W. Averell Harriman {30: 371., 78)., American Ambassador to
Russia in 1945., stated that it is very difficult to understand how one can
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say that the Russians violated the Yalta Charter if the agreements
were such a "betrayal" or "sell-out" as .many critics contend.
the agreements been a

11

Had

betrayal 11 or a "sell-out" by Roosevelt and

Churchill., Stalin would not have needed to violate them.
Harri.man was not critical of the Polish settlement.

Ambassador

Rather., he

believed that the agreements reached at Yalta were very favorable
for the Allies.

The Ambassador stated that the postwar problems of

today have resulted from the fact that the Russians have failed to
carry out the terms of the Yalta agreement rather than from the
agreement., itself.

McGeorge Bundy (9:621} expressed his belief

regarding Roosevelt and Churchill ts work at Yalta that "• •• they
did in fact obtain agreements which., if kept., would have amounted to
a pledge of lasting peace. "
Of all the arguments given in defense of the Polish settlement.,
none has been expressed more frequently than that given by R. H.
Crossman., D. F. Fleming., and John Gunther.

s.

Mr. Cross.man {14:421)

contended that Roosevelt and Churchill were negotiating from a
position of extreme weakness regarding the problems of Eastern
Europe.

He stated that since the powerful Red army occupied Poland

at the ti.me of the Yalta Conference that the Russians " • • • could have
the final say in Eastern Europe., including Poland., just as the Allies
could have the last word in Western Europe." D. F. Fleming (22:205)

24

remarked that concessions made by the West at Yalta "• •• reflected
the powerful position of the Soviet Union in Europe." The last
defender that the author will mention before stating his conclusion,
was John Gunther, who was veJ7y brief regarding the Polish settlement.

He {28:358) simply stated that, "What the Soviet Union tgotr

at Yalta, its armies already 1had.

t"

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The task of the historian, in his analysis of the Polish
Settlement., is to look at this agreement in an objective manner.
needs to examine it in terms of 1945 rather than of 1964.

He

The agree-

ment on Poland is perhaps the most controversial of all the Yalta
decisions., and it is the one that has given rise to the gravest charges of
defeat and betrayal.

Consequently, the historian must carefully

examine the Polish settlement from a realistic viewpoint rather than
a symbolic one.

He must also view the settlement in terms of what

was accomplished at Yalta rather than how the charter was later
violated.
An examination of the Polish settlement from an idealistic
viewpoint will lead one to form the conclusion that President Roosevelt
made so.me very serious mistakes at Yalta.

Without doubt, the Yalta

Charter should have contained a guarantee of a pledge to have so.me
form of supervision of the Polish election.

Also, one would believe

that a date should have been chosen for holding these elections.
none was mentioned in the Yalta Charter.

Yet

Neither does the Yalta

document clarify the exact meaning of the decision to reorganize the
Provisional government that was then functioning in Poland.
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Undoubtedly. Mr. Roosevelt did desire to solve these problems that
were previously mentioned.

Yet. it was probably this failure to

satisfactorily solve these problems that caused President Roosevelt
to describe the Polish settlement as a compromise.
Unfortunately. in the art of diplomacy. idealistic goals and
realistic goals are rarely the same.

Idealistically. the President,.

undoubtedly. desired to attain a more favorable settlement.

Realisti-

cally. he knew that many obstacles stood in the way of the type of
settlement that he desired.
Paramount to all other considerations when viewing the
Polish settlement. was the military situation in Europe on the eve of
the Yalta Conference.

The writer believes that President Roosevelt

was aware of the powerful position of the Red Army at that date;
therefore full agreement is accorded by the author to Mr. John
Guntherts statement that "What the Soviet Union 1 got 1 at Yalta. its
armies already 1 had. 111 Even President Roosevelt's critic,. Chester
Wilmot. admitted that the liberation of eastern Europe by the Red
Army placed Russia in the dominant position of power in Poland
(65:708).

With Russia occupying Poland in Februa:ry,. 1945• neither

Roosevelt nor Churchill were in the position to dictate the terms of the
Polish settlement.

The very powerful Red Army actually had decided

these terms at the time that it freed Poland from the Nazi troops.
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The isolationist attitude of the American people is the second
factor that has caused the writer to believe that Mr. Rooseveltts
Polish decisions at Yalta were realistic ones.

After every major

war in which the United States had been involved., the American people
had quickly reverted back to their previous isolationist attitude, upon
completion of the struggle.

With this thought in mind regarding the

American people, President Roosevelt was undoubtedly prompted to
state at Yalta that the United States would not maintain a large army
in Europe, three thousand miles away from home.

In fact, he said

that the United States would limit its post-war occupation in Europe
to two years (12:353).

Though the President was wrong regarding

the American isolationist attitude., he logically concluded from past
history that American public opinion would not allow him to keep
American forces in Europe for too long a period of time.

Thus the

only realistic settlement of Polish affairs was the recognition of the
Soviet Union as the most powerful state in Eastern Europe.
A third factor that has prompted this writer to believe that
the Polish settlement was not a "betrayal" is based upon Ambassador
Harrimants argument that has been mentioned earlier.

Had the

Polish agreements been as favorable to Russian interests as many
have contended, the writer does not believe that the Soviet Union would
have made such determined efforts to violate the Polish agreement.
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The Ambassador {30:378-79) stated that the
• • • fact is that these violations have been the basis of our
protests against Soviet actions since the end of the war. There
would have been a "sell-out" if Roosevelt and Churchill had
failed to bend every effort to come to an understanding with the
Soviet Union and had permitted the Red Army to occupy vast
areas without attempting to protest the interests of people in
those areas.
Viewing the Polish situation from a realistic standpoint1 the
author believes that President Roosevelt knew that without any agreement., the Red Army would not leave Poland after the war.

Even with

Yalta's Polish settlement1 which the writer believes was the best
possible agreement that Roosevelt and Churchill were able to obtain,
there was no guarantee that the Russians would depart once the war
had ended.

Yet 1 was it not better to gamble at Yalta with the hope

that Russia would honor her Polish pledge than to make impossible
demands which Stalin would certainly not have approved since his
army already controlled Poland?

Perhaps the best answer to that

question is found in an article that was written by Walter Lippman
(37:8) in which he stated1
The key to Yalta was the position reached by the Red Army
at the time of the conference in February, 1945. While we know
now what we wish had happened differently., even with the
advantage of hindsight it is hard to say what could and should
have been done to bring about that different result.

....

. . . . . . .

..

. . ....

.. . . ..

. . . . .

.. .

..

Had Eisenhower been able to invade France when the German
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and Russian armies were locked in a deadly struggle far inside
of Russia, we would be living today in a different world. Roosevelt and Churchill might then have had the deciding voice in
Eastern Europe. They might have talked with Stalin while
Eisenhower rather than Zhukov was in Warsaw. There would
have been no partition of Europe and of Germany.
But with Eisenhower still on the wrong side of the Rhine as
the war was ending, all they could get from the master, of the
Red army was a scrap of paper containing vague and ambiguous
pro.mises • • • •
Yet, what could have been done differently? They could not
compel Stalin to go home, taking his army with him. Quite the
contrary.
Stalin had the power to act; we had only the power to argue.
Before going to Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill were in no
position to dictate the terms for the Polish settlement.

At least, as a

result of the Polish settlement, an agreement was reached, which,
had it been kept, would have brought post-war peace to the world.
Perhaps Herbert Agurr s statement (2: 10) is true that

"•

• • Rooseveltts only crime at Yalta was his hopefulness."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Abel., Elie. "Key Antagonists Were Stalin and Churchill-Roosevelt Weary.," The New York Times., March 17., 1955.,
pp. 1., 79.
2.

Agur., Herbert. The Price of Power: America Since 1945.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press., 1957. 199 pp.

3.

Ascoli., Max. "The Road from Yalta.," American Journal of
Economics and Sociology., 14:347., July,, 1955.

4.

Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts., Inc., 1958. 896 pp.

5.

Baldwin., Hanson W. Great Mistakes of the War.
Redman Company., 1950. 105 pp.

6.

Blake, Nelson Manfred., and Oscar Theodore Barck., Junior. The
United States in Its World Relations. New York: McGraw-Hill
--Book Company., Inc • ., 1960. 840 pp.

7.

Butler" Nicholas. "Report of Crimea Conference"" International
Conciliation., 409: 185, March., 1945.

8.

"Britain Accepts the Yalta Charter But United States Keeps Fingers
Crossed.," Newsweek., 25:52., March 12., 1945.

9.

Bundy., McGeorge.
July., 1949.

London: Alvin

"The Test of Yalta.," Foreign Affairs. 27:618.,

10.

Byrnes., James. Speaking Frankly.
Publishers., 1947. 324 pp.

New York: Harper and Brothers

11.

Cardwell., Ann Su. "Why Not Repudiate Yaltars Betrayal of Poland
and Weaken Soviet Grip?.," Saturday Evening Post., 222:12.,
May 13., 1950.

12.

Churchill, Winston S. Triumph and Tragedy.
Mifflin Company., 1953. 800 pp.

Boston: Houghton

32
13.

Com.manger, Henry Steele, and Chester Wilmot. "Was Yalta a
Calamity? --A Debate," The New York Times Magazine.,
August 3, 1952. pp. 7., 48.

14.

Crossman., R. H. s. "The Lessons of Yalta.," The New Statesman
and Nation., 49:419., March 26., 1955.

15.

Dean, Vera Micheles. The Four Cornerstones of Peace.
McGraw-Hill Book Company., Inc • ., 1946. 267 pp.

16.

Deane., John. The Strange Alliance.
1947. 344 pp.

17.

Falls., Cyril. "A Window on the World.," Illustrated London News,
226:593., April 2., 1955.

New York:

New York: The Viking Press,

18. _ _ _ _ _ • "Aftermath of War: Yalta., Potsdam., and Rights in
Berlin," Illustrated London News, 213:126., July 31., 1948.
19.

Feis., Herbert. Between War and Peace. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press., 1960. 367 pp.

20. _ _ _ _ _• Churchill., Roosevelt and Stalin: The War They Waged
and the Peace They Sought. Princeton., New Jersey: Princeton
University Press., 1957. 692 pp.
21.

Fenno, Richard F. {ed.). The Yalta Conference.
Heath and Company., 1955. 112 pp.

Boston: D. C.

22.

Fleming, D. F. The Cold War and Its Origins. Vol. I. Garden
City, New York: Doubleday and Company., Inc • ., 1961. 540 pp.

23.

Flynn., John T. The Roosevelt Myth.
Company., Inc., 1948. 438 pp.

New York: The Devin-Adair

24. _ _ _ _ _ • "The Truth About Yalta.," The American Mercury., 80:5.,
July., 1955.
25.

"Foreign Policy at Crossroads: U. s. Moves to Repudiate Yalta.,"
Newsweek, 39:25., February 18., 1952.

33
26.

Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences of Malta
and Yalta. Washington: United States Government Printing
Office. 1955. 1032 pp.

27.

Gibney. Frank. Frozen Revolution.
and Cudahy. 1959. 269 pp.

28.

Gunther., John. Roosevelt in Retrospect.
Brothers Publishers. 1950. 410 pp.

29.

Halecki., Oscar. A History of Poland.
1956. 359 pp.

30.

Harriman, Averell W. "Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet
Union and the Agreements Reached at Yalta., 11 The Department
of State Bulletin• 25:371., September 3., 1951.

31.

Hudson., G. F.
1955.

32.

Kennan., George F. American Diplomacy--1900-1950. New York:
The New American Library of World Literature., Inc., 1951.
127 pp.

33.

and the West Under Lenin and Stalin. Boston:
- - - - - • Russia - -- --- --- ---

"Yalta.,

11

New York: Farrar, Straus,

New York: Harper and

New York: Roy Publishers.,

The Twentieth Century., 157:493, May,

Little, Brown and Company, 1961.

411 pp.

34.

Kecskemeti., Paul. Strategic Surrender. Palo Alto, California:
Stanford University Press., 1958. 287 pp.

35.

Lane, Arthur Bliss. __! Saw Poland Betrayed.
Bobbs Merrill Company., 1948. 344 pp.

36.

Leahy., Admiral William D. __! Was There. New York: Whittlesey
House., McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950 • 527 pp.

37.

Lippman" Walter. "What Else Could They Have Done at Yalta,
The Seattle Times., April 11., 1955" p. 8.

38.

Mikolajczyk., Stanislaw. The Pattern of Soviet Domination. London:
Sampson, Low, Marston and Company., Ltd., 1948. 353 pp.

Indianapolis" Indiana:

11

39. _ _ _ _ _ • The Rape of Poland. New York: McGraw Hill Book
Company., Inc • ., 1948. 309 pp.

34
40.

Morton, Louis. "The Military Background of the Yalta Agreements,"
The Reporter, 12:19, April 7, 1955.

41.

Neilson., Frances. "Churchill and Yalta.," American Journal of
Economics and Sociology, 4:347., July., 1955.

42.

Nevins, Allan (ed.). The New Deal in World Affairs. New Haven,
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1950. 332 pp.

43.

"Official Record of the Yalta Conference," The New York Times.,
April 11, 1955., pp. 47-78.

44.

Parsons., Wilfrid.
1955.

45.

Robinson, Edgar Eugene. The Roosevelt Leadership.
J. B. Lippincott Company, 1955. 491 pp.

46.

Roosevelt, Elliott. As He Saw It. New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce Company., 1946. 270 pp.

4.7.

Rosenman, Samuel I. The Public Pape.rs and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Vol. XIII. New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers<> 1950. 634 pp.

48.

Rozek, Edward J. Allied Wartime Diplomacy.
Wiley and Sons •. Inc • ., 1958. 481 pp.

49.

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins.
and Brothers Publishers, 1950. 1002 pp.

50.

"Sold Down the River," The Catholic World, 164:556, March, 1947.

51.

Son lag# Raymond J. "Reflections on the Yalta Paper.,
Affairs., 33:615., July, 1955.

52.

Staar, Richard F. Poland 1944 to 1962: The Sovietization of a
Captive People. New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press,
1962. 300 pp.

53.

Stalints Correspondence with Churchill., Attlee, Roosevelt and
Truman. Vol. II. New York: E. P. Delton and Company, Inc • .,
1941-45. 301 pp.

"Washington Front#" America, 93: 33, April 9•

Philadelphia:

New York: John

New York: Harper

11

Foreign

35
54.

Stettinus., Edward R • ., Junior. Roosevelt and the Russians.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc • ., 1949.
367 pp.

55.

Stimson, Henry L., and McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service in
Peace and War. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers.,
1948. 698 pp.

56.

Swing, Raymond. "What Really Happened at Yalta?," The New York
Times Magazine, February 20, 1949, p. 10.

57.

"The Facts of Life.,

58.

"The Yalta Story.," Time Magazine., 65:27., March 28, 1955.

59.

Treadgold, Donald w. Twentieth Century Russia.
Mc Nally and Company., 1959. 550 pp.

60.

Villard, Oswald Garrison. "Poland • • • A Moral Issue," The
Christian Century, 62:334., March 14, 1945.

61.

Wedemeyer, General Alber C. Wedemeyer Reports.
Henry Holt and Company., 1958. 497 pp.

62.

Wells., Sumner. Seven Decisions That Shaped History.
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950. 2 36 pp.

63.

"What the Big Three Really Said at the Yalta Conference,
News and World Report, 38:164, March 25., 1955.

64.

"When the United States Retreat Began- -Sixteen Years Ago,
U. ~- News and World Report, 50:93, May 15, 1961.

65.

Wilmot., Chester. The Struggle for Europe.
and Brothers Publishers, 1952. 766 pp.

66.

"Yalta rs Long Shadow,." Newsweek, 45:25, March 28, 1955.

67.

"Yalta Surrender Can rt Be Justified as Aid to Victory,.
Evening Post, October 5,. 1951, p. 10.

68.

Zacharias, Ellis M. "The Inside Story of Yalta,." U. N. World,
3:12, January, 1949.

11

The Reporter., 12:14, April 21, 1955.

Chicago: Rand

New York:

New York:

11

U. S.

11

New York: Harper

11

Saturday

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

A

Mr. Molotov 1 s six-point proposal regarding the Polish question (26:716):

1. It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern frontier
of Poland with a digression from it in some regions of 5-8 kilometers
in favor of Poland.
2.

It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced
from the town of Stettin (Polish) and farther to the South along the
River Oder and still farther along the River Neisse (Western).

3.

It was dee.med desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Government

some democratic leaders from Polish ~migre circles.
4.

It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish

Government should be recognized by the Allied Governments.
5.

It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government.

enlarged as was mentioned above in paragraph 3., should as soon as
possible call the population of Poland to the polls for organization
by general voting of permanent organs of the Polish Government.
6.

V. M. Molotov. Mr. Harri.man and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were
entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the
Provisional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to
the consideration of the three Governments.

APPENDIX

B

POLISH CHARTER {26:973-94)

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our
differences about Poland.

We discussed all aspects of the question.

We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong. free~
independent and democratic Poland.

As a result of our discussions

we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to
command recognition by the three major powers.
The agreement reached is as follows:
A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her
complete liberation by the Red Army.

This calls for the establishment

of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based
than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland.
Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should
therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the
inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles
abroad.

This new Government should then be called the Polish

Provisional Government of National Unity.

The
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M. Molotov., Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are
authorized as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow
with members of the present Provisional Government and with other
Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad• with
a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the
above lines.

This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity

shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as
soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.

In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the
right to take part and to put forward candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity
has been properly formed in conformity with the above., the Government
of the

u. s.

S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the

present Provisional Government of Poland., and the Government of the
United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish
diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Governments of
National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the
respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in
Poland.
The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern
frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from
it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland.

They
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recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory
in the north and west.

They feel that the opinion of the new Polish

Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due
course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation
of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace
Conference.

